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BUYER RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION
CHARLES J. STEELE* AND DANIEL T. COUGHLIN **
The policy of the Federal Trade Commission with regard to anti-
trust enforcement in the area of the buyer-seller relationship has been,
until recently, embodied in the theory of Caveat Vendor. In an expan-
sion of this theory defined by the then Chairman of the Commission,
Earl W. Kintner, as "Resurgens," 1 this policy has been expanded to
embrace the doctrine of Caveat Emptor.
On August 19, 1960, the Federal Trade Commission ordered The
Grand Union Company,' in effect, to stop inducing disproportionate
promotional allowances from its suppliers. On March 7, 1960, a simi-
lar order had been issued by the hearing examiner against Giant Food,
Inc.,' and on May 27, 1960, still another examiner rendered such an
order against The American News Company and the Union News
Cornpany,4 which decision was affirmed as to this proscription by the
Commission on January 10, 1961. 5 The Grand Union decision was the
first such action by the Commission in a litigated case. There have
been no court decisions as yet.
The decisions by the Commission in the Grand Union and Ameri-
can News cases are bound to have a substantial effect upon chain
stores and other large buyers subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission.
The statute relied upon by the Commission as the basis for its or-
ders to cease and desist from inducing disproportionate promotional
allowances, or, in effect, from inducing a violation of Section 2(d)° of
* A.B., Georgetown University 1952; LL.B., Georgetown University 1954; LL.M.,
Georgetown University 1956. Member of the Bars of the District of Columbia and
Supreme Court of the United States. With the firm of: Whiteford, Hart, Carmody &
Wilson, Washington, D.C.
** A.B., Ohio State University 1951; LL.B., Boston College Law School 1956.
Member of the Bars of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Supreme Court of the
United' States. Assistant Dean, Boston College Law School.
1 Kintner, "Resurgens: The Federal Trade Commission in 1959," Antitrust Law
Symposium (1960).
2 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 1 28980 (1960).
3 Trade Reg. Rep. (1959-1960 FTC Cas.) fl 28624.
4 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 1 28811 (1960).
5 3 Trade Reg. Rep.	 29335 (1961).
e 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1958) provides: "It shall be unlawful
for any person engaged in commerce to pay or contract for the payment of anything
of value to or for the benefit of a customer of such person in the course of such com-
merce as compensation or in consideration for any services or facilities furnished by or
through such customer in connection with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for
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the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, was not a
provision of the latter Act. It was Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. 7 Although the Federal Trade Commission Act was
enacted in 1914, the Commission's action in the Grand Union case was
one of first impression.
To the discomfort of large buyers, the Commission has been
showing renewed activity with respect to Section 2(0 8 of the Clayton
Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. In 1959, there were
before the Commission ten proceedings, complaints in which had been
charged violations of Section 2(f). Contrast this with the period 1936
through 1959, during which time there had been only thirty-four 2(f)
proceedings altogether.
PREVIOUS BUYER LIABILITY
It will be of assistance to trace the history of buyer liability to
Federal Trade regulation to appreciate the apparent extension of such
liability under recent cases.
Between 1914, the year in which the Clayton° and Federal Trade
Commission Acts 1° were enacted, and the passage of the Robinson-
Patman Amendment to the Clayton Act in 1936, buyers were fairly
impervious to legal responsibility arising from business dealings with
their suppliers. The Clayton Act did not affect them, and the Sherman
Act,11 in practice at least, had little effect with respect to their dealings
with their suppliers. The vague Federal Trade Commission Act was
on the books, but no one had yet suggested, let alone acted upon the
theory, that it prohibited a buyer from obtaining the best deal that he
could from his supplier.
By 1934, there was considerable agitation to change this hands-
off policy with respect to buyers, the principal reasons for this being the
buying practices of, and the favored treatment demanded and received
by, the new, large chain stores. In 1934, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion recommended to the Senate that the law be revised with respect to
sale of any products or commodities manufactured, sold, or offered for sale by such
person, unless such payment or consideration is available on proportionally equal terms
to all other customers competing in the distribution of such products or commodities."
7 38 Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. 45(a) (1958) provides: "Unfair methods of com-
petition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are hereby
declared unlawful."
8 Section 2(f) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 49
Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. 13(f) (1958) provides: "That it shall be unlawful for
any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, knowingly to induce
or receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section."
9 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§, 12-27 (1958).
10 38 Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. ¢§ 41-58 (1958).
11 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §1 1-7 (1958).
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price discrimination." In 1935, several amendments to the Clayton
Act were introduced in Congress. One of these was introduced in the
Senate by Senator Robinson and in the House by Representative
Patman. Although it was the increasing power of large buyers such
as the chain stores which constituted the problem which Congress was
trying to solve, the bill as introduced, with one exception, applied only
to sellers." During Senate debate the provision which ultimately
became Section 2(f) was introduced by Senator Copeland.
As finally enacted into law in 1936, the Robinson-Patman Act
contained provisions against granting price discrimination not justi-
fied by other provisions in the act," against granting or receiving
brokerage payments to or from any party on the other side of the
transaction," against granting promotional allowances except on
proportionally equal terms," against making payments for services or
facilities except on proportionally equal terms," and against the
knowing inducement or receipt of "a discrimination in price which is
prohibited by this section.""
Although the buyer was the problem with which the Act sought
to deal, almost all of the restrictions had been placed upon the seller.
Section 2(f) was directed against the buyer, but it was expressly
limited to discrimination in price. It was, therefore, complementary
to Section 2(a) only. There was no provision comparable to 2(f)
which prohibited the knowing inducement or receipt of dispropor-
tionate promotional allowances or the disproportionate granting of
services or facilities. There was no provision complementary to
Sections 2(d) or 2(e).
FTC PROCEEDING AGAINST BUYERS
Since enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act, the buyer may
have been affected by Commission orders against his suppliers but he
has been affected only slightly by Commission proceedings against
him."
tu This recommendation was the result of the FTC's investigation into chain stores,
as directed by the Senate in 1928. S. Res. 224, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928).
13 It was a violation of the act for a buyer to receive a brokerage payment from
the seller. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1958). Even this exception was not
clear at the time, but later cases definitely fixed responsibility for brokerage payments
on buyer as well as seller, when a broker for a buyer received payments from a seller.
Modern Marketing Service, Inc. v. FTC, 149 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1945).
14 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a), (b)	 (1958).
13 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1958).
16 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1958)
11 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 23(e) (1958).
18 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1958).
This article does not go into 2(c), brokerage proceedings against buyers. There
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From September 30, 1936, when the first 2(f) complaint was
issued, through April 4, 1960, 34 complaints were issued by the Com-
mission charging violations of Section 2(f), an average of just under
1Y2
 complaints per year. 2° Twenty-five cease and desist orders had
been entered in these cases, most of them the result of consent settle-
ments.'
The first 2(f) proceeding, September 30, 1936, was directed
against Montgomery Ward.22
 The complaint alleged that Montgomery
Ward had induced a price discrimination from Bird and Son, Inc., a
distributor of "hard surfaced felt base floors" or "rugs." Bird and Son
was charged with a 2(a) violation in a different count of the same
complaint. The Commission dismissed both complaints, stating:
"The price discrimination alleged is to be found only
during a four-month period of transition from a policy of
selling ordinary retailers direct, to one of supplying through
sales made to jobbers. Any price discrimination during that
period was incidental to that transition and involved a negli-
gible proportion and amount of seller-respondents' business.
"Since the case against seller-respondents fails for the
reasons above stated, the case against buyer-respondent,
for receiving an unlawful price discrimination, also fails." 23
Success for Commission Counsel followed this initial setback,
however, and the Commission issued 2(f) cease and desist orders
in 1937 against Pittsburgh Plate Glass," in 1938 against the Golf Ball
Mfrs. Ass'n,25 in 1939 against Miami Wholesale Drug Co." and
American Oil Co.," in 1941 against A. S. Alse Co.,28 in 1944 against
have been a few of them. See Edwards, The Price Discrimination Law, chapters
5 and 6 (1959) for an exhaustive study of Section 2(c).
20 Section 2(f) complaints were issued in FTC Dockets 2937, 3154, 3161, 3377, 3820,
3843, 4548, 4556, 4933, 4957, 5027, 5421, 5648, 5728, 5766, 5767, 5794, 5990, 5991, 6698,
6765, 6837, 6888, 6889, 6890, 7070, 7142, 7365, 7492, 7590, 7592, 7686, 7687.
21 Cease and desist orders were issued and not reversed on appeal, in FTC Dockets
3154, 3161, 3377, 3820, 3843, 4548, 4556, 4957, 5027, 5698, 5724, 5766, 5767, 5794, 6698,
6765, 6837, 6888, 6890, and 7142. Of these only A.S. Alse Co., Docket 3820, 34 F.T.C.
363 (1941), E. J. Brach & Sons, Docket 4548, 39 F.T.C. 535 (1944), Curtiss Candy,
Docket 4556, 44 F.T.C. 237 (1947), order modified, 48 F.T.C. 161 (1951), and Atlantic
City Wholesale Drug Co., Docket 4957, 38 F.T.C. 631 (1944) contested the proceedings
at the Commission level and none of these appealed to the courts.
22 25 F.T.C. 548 (1937).
23 Id. at 553.
25 26 F.T.C. 1228 (1937).
23 26 F.T.C. 824 (1939).
26 28 F.T.C. 485 (1939).
27 29 F.T.C. 857 (1939).
28 34 F.T.C. 363 (1941).
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E. J. Brach & Sons," and Atlantic City Wholesale Drug Co.," and in
1945 against Associated Merchandising Corp."
It was not much in the way of volume, but during that period
no respondent successfully defended a 2(f) charge. All complaints
led to orders. Curiously, none of these respondents appealed to the
courts.
In June of 1950, the Commission issued a 2(1) order against
Automatic Canteen Co. of Americe2
 and Automatic Canteen did
appeal.'
The Automatic Canteen case proved to be a staggering blow to
Federal Trade Commission regulation of buyer activity.
The Commission found that Automatic Canteen had knowingly
induced and received discriminations in the prices of candy and other
confections and in so doing had violated Section 2(f). It issued a
cease and desist order based on this finding.
At the Commission level, Automatic Canteen had maintained
that the Commission had the burden of proving that the suppliers'
lower prices to Automatic Canteen were not cost justified. The Com-
mission's position was that cost justification was an affirmative defense
with respect to which the respondent had the burden of proceeding,
be it a 2(a) proceeding or a 2(f) proceeding, and that all the Com-
mission had to do to prove a prima facie 2(f) case against a 'buyer
was to prove a prima facie 2(a) case against the supplier, and that
Automatic Canteen had knowingly received or induced the lower price.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the Commission, quoting Sec-
tion 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act that once the Commission
has proved a discrimination in price, "the burden of rebutting the
prima facie case thus made by showing justification shall be upon
the person charged with a violation of this section!'"
20 39 F.T.C. 535 (1944).
30 3g F.T.C. 631 (1944).
31 40 F.T.C. 578 (1945).
32 46 F.T.C. 861 (1950).
33 Since that appeal the Commission has issued 2(f) cease and desist orders against
National Tea Co., 46 F.T.C. 829, 47 F.T.C. 1314 (1951) ; Atlas Supply Co., 48 F.T.C. 53
(1951) ; Shell Oil Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (1957-1958 FTC Cas.) 11 27143; Hunt Marquardt,
Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. (1957-1958 FTC Cas.) 11 27402; Midwest Warehouse Distributors
Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. (1957-1958 FTC Cas.) 11 27478; Allbright's, Trade Reg. Rep.
(1959-1960 FTC Cas.) 11 27922; Mid-South Distributors, Trade Reg. Rep. (1959-1960
FTC Cas.) II 27846; Metropolitan Automotive Wholesalers Cooperative, Inc., Trade Reg.
Rep. (1959-1960 FTC Cas.) IT 27876; Automotive Supply Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (1959-
1960 FTC Cas.) 11 28235; March of Toys, Inc., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 1.1 29020 (1960) ;
Southwestern Warehouse Distributors, Inc., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 11 29071 (1960) ; Southern
California Jobbers, Inc., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. If 29172 (1960).
34 194 F.2d 433, 437 (7th Cir. 1952).
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The Supreme Court reversed in a decision to which there were
three dissents. 35 After making his oft quoted comment that "precision
of expression is not an outstanding characteristic of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act," Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, stated:
"It is therefore apparent that the discriminatory price that
buyers are forbidden by § 2(f) to induce cannot include
price differentials that are not forbidden to sellers in other
sections of the Act, and, what is pertinent in this case, a
buyer is not precluded from inducing a lower price based on
cost differences that would provide the seller with a
defense.'"6
Justice Frankfurter concluded that Section 2(f) makes "it unlawful
only to induce or receive prices known [by the buyer] to be pro-
hibited discrimination,"" and "a buyer is not liable under Section 2(f)
if the lower prices he induces are either within one of the seller's
defenses such as the cost of justification or not known by him not to
be within one of those defenses."'
Since this was so, Justice Frankfurter went on, the Commission
should have the burden of proceeding with evidence to show that
the low price induced by Automatic Canteen, the buyer, was not
cost justified, with respect to costs of the seller, and so was not in
fact a lawful price falling within the proviso of Section 2 (a) dealing
with cost justification.
Upon remand, the Commission dismissed the case against Auto-
matic Canteen because the record did not contain evidence showing
the prices received by Automatic Canteen were not cost justified."
Automatic Canteen temporarily paralyzed the Commission with
respect to Section 2(f).
Almost at once it dismissed existing 2(f) proceedings against
Safeway Stores, Inc.," and The Kroger Co., 4 ' giving as the reason the
Automatic Canteen decision. In 1954 the 2(f) case against Sylvania
Electric Products was dismissed for failure of proof," and in 1955
the 2(f) case against Crown Zellerbach was likewise dismissed,43 the
Commission again relying on Automatic Canteen.
35 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
38 Id. at 70.
37 Id. at 72.
38 Id. at 74.
31} 51 F.T.C. 574 (1955).
40 50 F.T.C. 125, Dismissed July 27, 1953.
41 50 F.T.C. 213, Dismissed Sept. 8, 1953.
42 51 F.T.C. 282, Dismissed Sept. 23, 1954.
43 51 F.T.C. 733, Dismissed Feb. 9, 1955.
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Federal Trade Regulation of buyers had reached its low water
mark. Since the enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act the Com-
mission had issued, on the average, less than two 2(f) complaints a
year, had issued less than one 2(f) order per year, and had been
clobbered in its only 2(1) court test.
The recovery of Section 2(f) was not immediate, and it may
not yet be complete. Events in 1958, however, showed it had not yet
returned to dust. Shell Oil Co.," Hunt Marquardt, Inc.," Warehouse
Distributors, Inc.," and Midwest Warehouse Distributors, Inc.," were
all charged with knowingly inducing or receiving price discrimi-
nations, and in 1958 all four took consent orders.' Allbright's" and
Automotive Supply Co." followed suit in 1959, as did March of Toys,
Inc.,51 Southwestern Warehouse Distributors, Inc.,' and Automotive
Southwest, Inc.," in 1960.
Aside from these uncontested cases, the Commission issued 2(f)
orders in a few contested cases, Midsouth Distributors, Inc." on
January 24, 1959, Metropolitan Automotive Wholesalers Cooperative,
Inc.," on March 12, 1959, and Southern California Jobbers, Inc.," on
November 10, 1960. All three cases involved essentially the same
fact situation:
Major suppliers in the automotive parts business had basic
list prices. Specified successively increasing percentage reductions off
the basic list prices were offered to jobbers for specified increases in
dollar volume purchases. These cumulative volume rebates and
graduated price schedules were accorded all purchasers and were
available generally throughout the industry. Certain companies
engaged as jobbers in the sale and distribution of automotive parts
formed a cooperative association. Purchases of automotive parts from
the suppliers were made for the member-jobbers by the cooperative
44 Trade Reg. Rep. (1956-1957 FTC Cas.) V 26324.
45 Trade Reg. Rep. (1956-1957 FTC Cas.) V 26453.
46 Trade Reg. Rep. (1957-1958 FTC Cas.) 	 26612
47 Trade Reg. Rep. (1957-1958 FTC Cas.) ¶ 26712.
48 Shell Oil Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (1957-1958 FTC Cas.) 11 27143; Hunt Marquardt,
Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. (1957-1958 FTC Cas.) l 27698; Warehouse Distributors Inc.,
Trade Reg. Rep. (1957-1958 FTC Cas.) ¶ 27402; Midwest Warehouse Distributors Inc.,
Trade Reg. Rep. (1957-1958 FTC Cas.) ¶ 27478.
46 Trade Reg. Rep. (1959-1960 FTC Cas.) 11 27922.
5° Trade Reg. Rep. (1959-1960 FTC Cas.) 	 28235.
51 3 Trade Reg. Rep. ¶ 29020 (1960).
52 3 Trade Reg. Rep. If 29071 (1960).
56 Ibid.
54 Trade Reg. Rep. (1959-1960 FTC Cas.) 	 27896.
55 Trade Reg. Rep. (1959-1960 FTC Cas.)	 27876.
56 3 Trade Reg. Rep. ¶ 29172 (1960), appeal pending, 9th Circuit, #17222, filed
Jan. 4, 1961.
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association and although the orders, made in the name of the co-
operative, were processed by the suppliers in the same manner as . if
they had been received directly from the individual jabber instead
of in the cooperative's name, volume discounts were computed on the
basis of the total purchases for all member-jobbers through the co-
operative. After deducting operating expenses of the cooperative,
these volume rebates were distributed to member-jobbers in propor-
tion to each member-jobber's purchases for the year. The effect of
this was to give member-jobbers a substantially lower cost than would
have been paid for the same kind and quantity of goods by such
jobber individually or by a competing individual jobber.
In issuing its order in Midsouth the Commission stated:
"The Automatic Canteen case, supra, holds, however,
that in order to establish a violation of Section 2(f), the
Commission as a part of its case must show more than that
the buyer knew of the price differentials and of this probable
competitive effect. In other words, under the 'balance of
convenience' rule applied by the court, the burden is on
counsel in support of the complaint to come forward origi-
nally with evidence that the buyer is not a mere unsuspect-
ing recipient of the prohibited discriminations. Such
violations under the Court's opinion must include a show-
ing that the buyer, knowing full well that there was little
likelihood of a cost justification defense available to the
seller nevertheless induced or received the discriminatory
prices. Just what evidence is necessary to make this show-
ing, as the court indicated, will, of necessity, vary with the
circumstances of each case. That trade experience in a
particular situation can afford a sufficient degree of knowl-
edge, however, is clear."47
In Metropolitan the Commission then added:
"It is obvious from the record in this matter that re-
spondent jobbers were receiving rebates which ranged up to
19% higher than those received by competing jobbers and
that respondents were aware of these price differences and
the probable adverse effect thereof on competition."58
The Commission then commented further on Automatic Canteen:
"We do not construe the Court's opinion in Automatic
Canteen as imposing upon counsel supporting the com-
57 Supra note 54, at 36919.
58 Supra note 55, at 36942.
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plaint the additional burden of showing as a part of his case
that respondents knew or should have known that the 'de-
fenses' of fluctuating market conditions and good faith meet-
ing of lower competitive prices were not available to the
sellers. As we stated In the Matter of D & N Auto Parts
Company, Inc., et al., supra, we believe that the respondents
would more readily have evidence concerning such 'defenses'
and that under the 'balance of convenience' doctrine would
have the burden of coming forward with it." 88
The Commission then protected itself by adding:
"However, if in this respect we are in error, it seems
clear that the required knowledge on the part of respond-
ents has been shown." 8°
And so the Commission attempted to move forward. On May 5,
1960, the Second Circuit added impetus to the movement by affirming
the 2(f) order issued by the Commission in Metropolltan.81 The
Court emphasized "trade experience" as a means by which a buyer
may be held to have had knowledge that what it induced was an
unjustifiable price discount.
"Petitioners also strenuously contend that under Auto-
matic Canteen v. F.T.C., 346 U.S. 61 (1953), the Commis-
sion failed to establish that petitioners knowingly induced
or received discriminatory prices, a finding required by Sec-
tion 2(f). Automatic Canteen held that, despite the provi-
sions of Section 2(b), the Commission did not establish,
prima facie, a violation of Section 2(f) merely by introduc-
ing evidence that the buyer had received prices lower than
its competitors, but that the Commission must also come
forward with some evidence that the buyer knew that the
prices it was receiving violated Section 2(a). However, the
Court, supra, at pp. 79-80, spoke further in language that
is here very pertinent:
Tut trade experience in a particular situation can
afford a sufficient degree of knowledge to provide a basis
for prosecution. By way of example a buyer who knows that
he buys in the same quantities as his competitor and is
served by the seller in the same manner or with the same
amount of exertion as the other buyer can fairly be charged
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 278 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1960).
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with notice that a substantial price differential cannot be
justified. The Commission need only to show, to establish
its prima facie case, that the buyer knew that the methods
by which he was served and quantities in which he pur-
chased were the same as in the case of his competitor. If
the methods or quantities differ, the Commission must only
show that such differences could not give rise to sufficient
savings in the cost of manufacture, sale or delivery to justify
the price differential, and that the buyer, knowing these were
the only differences, should have known that they could not
give rise to sufficient cost savings.' (Emphasis supplied.)
"Petitioners of course knew that they, as individual
firms, were receiving goods in the same quantities and were
served by sellers in the same manner as their competitors,
and hence organized themselves into a buying group in order
to obtain lower prices than their unorganized competitors.
Hence, by the very fact of having combined into a group and
having obtained thereby a favorable price differential, they
each, under Automatic Canteen, were charged with notice
that this price differential they each enjoyed could not be
justified. And this knowledge of each of the seventeen
individual firms is imputable to the organization of which
they were all members. Thus, irrespective of whether the
buying groups' efforts to bargain with the various manu-
facturers constituted an improper inducement under Sec-
tion 2(f), we hold that the Commission introduced sufficient
evidence to fulfill the requirements of Automatic Canteen
when it showed that petitioners knowingly received preferen-
tial price treatment of such a nature as to violate Sec-
tion 2."62
The Fifth Circuit kept the ball rolling by affirming the Com-
mission's order in Midsouth. Commenting on Automatic Canteen, the
Court stated:
"The decision hardly meant . .. to impose any rigid
mechanical requirements. On the contrary, the Court's
opinion reflects an awareness that this critical knowledge
of the buyer as to both (a) the underlying facts constituting
the asserted justification and (b) the conclusion that it
would not legally constitute a justification may have to be
established from indirect circumstantial inferences. Rarely
62 Id. at 228-29.
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will buyers have committed the crudities to permit cate-
gorical and direct proof. Of course, this is not to let down
the bars. The imponderable, elusive nature of 'costs' which
led the Court to impose the laboring oar on the Commission
rather than on the buyer makes it necessary that like pro-
tection—if not more so—be afforded the buyer where the
attack is circumstantial. But within those limits much is
available from which safely to draw reliable inferences.
With its 1306 printed pages and hundreds of detailed,
tabulated exhibits, we could not begin to detail the evidence
of this record. The sum of it, briefly compressed, is quite
sufficient to show the basis for inferences of buyer knoweldge
of seller non-justification. The outstanding factor is that as
to a specific purchase order the particular member-Jobber
knew two things: First, the price he was obtaining through
the Co-op was substantially lower than his group (b) (indi-
vidual) competitors were required to pay. Second, for all
practical purposes, the order and shipment were handled
exactly the same."©3 (Emphasis supplied.)
Assuming that the Commission's expertise will be a principal
means of determining the existence of necessary "trade experience,"
and the reasonable inferences resulting therefrom, it may well be that
Automatic Canteen has become the Maginot Line of buyer-inducer
protection.
As of March 1, 1961, there were pending before the Commission
four 2(f) proceedings, against American Metal Products Co.," Fred
Meyer, Inc.," Automatic Jobbers, Inc.," and Ark-La-Tex Warehouse
Distributors, Inc."
About the only conclusion which can be drawn at present with
respect to Section 2(f) and the liability of a buyer with respect to
the price he "knowingly induces or receives" are:
(1) To make out a prima Jack case the Commission counsel
must prove that the discriminatory price the buyer received was not
cost justified and that the buyer knew, or should have known, it was
not cost justified.
(2) The Commission, but perhaps not the courts, will hold that
respondent buyer has the burden of proceeding with respect to the
63 1961 Trade Cases 11 69939, at 77709-10.
64 Trade Reg. Rep. (1959-1960 FTC Cas.) 27761 (complaint).
85 Trade Reg. Rep. (1959-1960 FTC Cas.)	 fl 28027 (complaint).
66 Trade Reg. Rep. (1959-1960 FTC Cas.) 11 28258 (complaint).
67 Ibid.
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other statutory defense contained in Sections 2(a) and 2(b); and
(3) Quite probably 2(f) complaints will be forthcoming in the
future with more frequency than they have in the past.
SECTION 5 OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT, THE BUYER,
AND THE GRAND UNION DECISION
In Miami Wholesale Drug Co. 68 and Atlantic City Drug Co."
the Commission had issued 2(f) complaints against buyers for induc-
ing promotional allowances, such, it was alleged, being an induce-
ment of an indirect price discrimination. The Commission orders to
cease and desist were not appealed to the courts in either case.
Using Section 2 (f) as a vehicle for proceeding against inducers
of disproportionate advertising allowances had certain obvious draw-
backs for commission counsel. For one thing, counsel supporting
the complaint would have to prove that the allowance knowingly
induced or received by respondent buyer was not only disproportion-
ate to allowances his competitor received, but also constituted an
indirect price discrimination. Conceivably a payment could be a
disproportionate promotional allowance, and still not be an indirect
price discrimination. Then too in proving a 2(1) violation, counsel
supporting the complaint would have the Automatic Canteen burden of
proving that the disproportionate promotional allowance received was
not cost justified. Since cost justification apparently is no defense to
a 2(d) violation," this burden would not fall upon Commission coun-
sel if there were some other theory on which there could be predicated
a violation of law for inducing disproportionate promotional allow-
ances; some way, in other words, other than alleging _that the pro-
motional allowance received was really a price discrimination as
prohibited under Section 2(a).
The problem was that the only provision in the Robinson-Patman
Act referring to one who "knowingly received or induced" was Sec-
tion 2(f), and it was limited, by its terms, to a - discrimination in price.
It did not mention the knowing receipt or inducement of dispropor-
tionate promotional allowances.
Section 5(a) (1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act states:
"Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and un-
fair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are hereby
declared unlawful."
68 28 F.T.C. 485 (1939).
69 38 F.T.C. 631 (1944).
7° See Simplicity Patterns v. FTC, 360 U.S. 55 (1959).
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Is it not an unfair method of competition for a buyer knowingly
to receive or induce from its supplier a disproportionate promotional
allowance? Is this not in effect inducing a supplier to violate Sec-
tion 2(d) ? Certainly the inducing of a violation of the Clayton Act
is contrary to the policy of the Clayton Act. Something contrary to
the policy of the Clayton Act ought to be an unfair method of com-
petition. So ran the reasoning of the Commission's staff, and a sub-
stantial number of complaints were the result."
In these complaints respondents were charged with violations
of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act for inducing dis-
proportionate promotional allowances which were allegedly in viola-
tion of Section 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act.
As in the case of Section 2(f), opinions by the Commission and
courts were not quickly forthcoming. Proceedings against United
Cigar- Whelan Stores Corp. resulted in a consent order in 1956, 72 and
those against Associated Barr Stores, Inc. ended in the same manner
in 1958." A similar Section 5 complaint against Food Fair Stores,
Inc. was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction." Another proceeding
against Giant Food Shopping Center was delayed by motions, inter-
locutory appeals and the death of the hearing examiner.
The first initial decision in a contested proceeding involving this
new use of Section 5 was in the proceeding against The Grand Union
Company." It was filed on September 30, 1959, and ordered Grand
Union to cease and desist from:
"Knowingly inducing, receiving or contracting for the
receipt of anything of value as compensation or in con-
sideration for advertising, promotional display or other
services or facilities furnished by or through respondent
in connection with the sale or offering for sale of products
sold to respondent by any of its suppliers, when such pay-
71 Between December 1957 and June 1960 the Commission issued nine complaints
charging buyers with violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
through knowing inducement or receipt of special payments and benefits from suppliers
which had not been made available on proportionally equal terms to all competing
customers. As of May 1, 1960 the Commission was investigating 22 other similar alleged
violations. Statements by Chairman Kintner at June 3, 1960 meeting of Carolinas-Vir-
ginia purchasing agents at Ashville, North Carolina.
72 .
 Trade Reg. Rep. (1956-1957 FTC Cas.) I[ 126137.
73 Trade Reg. Rep. (1957-1958 FTC Cas.) 11 27616.
74 Trade Reg. Rep. (1957-1958 FTC Cas.) 26729. Food Fair convinced the Com-
mission that it was a meat packer and so subject to the jurisdiction of the Department
of Agriculture and not the Federal Trade Commission.
75 Trade Reg. Rep. (1959-1960 FTC Cas.)
	 28313 (hereinafter referred to as
Initial Decision).
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ment is not affirmatively offered or otherwise made avail-
able by such suppliers on proportionally equal terms to all
other customers competing with respondent in the sale and
distribution of the suppliers' products."
The Grand Union case was hotly contested. It grew out of the
following situation:
Douglas Leigh, Inc. was a New York advertising firm. It owned
and operated many large signs in the Times Square Area of New
York City. One of these signs contained on it an electric "Epok
Panel" which would display cartoons on a panel of light bulbs. This
sign was leased to Grand Union for the nominal sum of $50.00. The
stationary part of the sign was fashioned into a replica of the Grand
Union Tower, and the name "Grand Union" was placed on it in
several prominent places. The slogan "Your money buys more at
your Grand Union Store" also appeared on the sign. For this adver-
tising Grand Union paid nothing. Grand Union agreed, however, to
procure 15 to 20 of its suppliers as "Participating Advertisers" on
the sign. For $1,000 a month each, payable to Douglas Leigh, Inc.,
cartoon commercials of the products of these suppliers of Grand Union
would appear three times an hour on the "Epok Panel" of the sign.
Grand Union received a portion of this money paid to Douglas Leigh
by the "Participating Advertisers," but the Commission was unable
to prove that the "Participating Advertisers" knew this, and in fact
one "Participating Advertiser," a respondent in another case, denied
any such knowledge." Grand Union gave special in-store displays
to its suppliers who became "Participating Advertisers," and in one
instance agreed to stop buying the goods of a supplier's competitor if
the supplier became a "Participating Advertiser." 77 As a result of
the deal, Grand Union got free advertising in Times Square from
December 10, 1952 to December 31, 1956, radio and television ad-
vertising," and cash returns of over $14,000.
The suppliers, for their $1,000 a month, got space on the "Epok
Panel" and, the complaint alleged, in-store promotions as part of
the deal. At least one supplier, Swanee, denied in its Section 2(d)
76 Swanee Paper, Trade Reg. Rep. (1959-1960 FTC Cas.) 11 28212, at 37102.
77 General Mills, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. (1959-1960 FTC Cas.) I 28201. General
Mills was charged by the FTC with a violation of Section 3 of the Clayton Act growing
out of this sign transaction. The case was dismissed by the hearing examiner for lack
of substantial effect on competition. Commission counsel did not appeal to the Com-
mission.
78 Grand Union traded some time and space on the "Epok Panel" to newspapers
and TV stations in return for advertising in those media.
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proceeding that the in-store promotions it received, at no extra cost,
were part of the sign deal. 79
Douglas Leigh got $1,000 a month from the "Participating
Advertisers" procured for it by Grand Union.
In its Section 5 proceeding, Grand Union defended on two prin-
cipal grounds: "
( 1 ) Section 5 of the FTC Act did not prohibit the inducing of
disproportionate promotional allowances.
(2) Commission counsel had the burden of proving that
(a) The suppliers had violated 2(d), and
(b) Grand Union knew they had done so,
and this burden had not been met.
The first defense was purely one of law.. Grand Union contended
that Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act could be used
only against violations of the Sherman or Clayton Acts, or to nip
in the bud incipient violations of those acts. It could not be used to
broaden the concept of the antitrust laws, and make illegal a prac-
tice not prohibited by one of the antitrust laws.
Grand Union went further and maintained that Congress had
intentionally declined to make unlawful the inducing of disproportion-
ate promotional allowances when it failed to do so in the Robinson-
Patman Act.
"During the more than 20 years between the enactment
of the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Robinson-
Patman Act, the practices that are now regulated by the
latter Act were wholly lawful. When, therefore, the Congress
legislated with respect to the questions in issue in the instant
case, it, for the first time, established the category of illegal
acts roughly known as price discrimination and defined the
limits of that category. Laws are presumed to be passed with
deliberation and with a knowledge of all existing laws on the
same subject. [Citations omitted.]
"Where, as here, Congress has affirmatively prohibited
certain acts and at the same time has clearly declined to
render unlawful directly related though different acts, there
is no room to argue that the acts not prescribed by the
78 The hearing examiner and Commission found otherwise, however, in the 2(d)
proceeding against Swanee. Trade Reg. Rep, (1959-1960 FTC Cas.) n 28212 (hearing
examiner); 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 28675 (1960) (Commission).
8(1 A third defense was that Grand Union had discontinued participation in the sign
deal prior to the issuance of the complaint. The examiner and Commission rejected
this defense. Cf. 3 Trade Reg. Rep. If 28980 at 37484 (1960).
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Congress may nevertheless be considered illegal. Nor may
an earlier and general statute [the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act] be extended to illegalize the acts that the Congress
has declined to condemn in a later and specific statute [the
Robinson-Patman Act.]""
In other words, since in the Robinson-Patman Act Congress
made it unlawful both to grant and to induce or receive discrimina-
tions in price, but only to grant disproportionate promotional allow-
ances and not to induce or receive them, the Federal Trade Com-
mission could not use the older, more general Federal Trade Com-
mission Act to fill the gap.
To this Commission Counsel replied: S2
"Considering the breadth and scope of the Federal Trade
Commission Act . . . , it is indeed too broad an assumption
to say that the practice encompassed by the Robinson-
Patman Act were not previously actionable under the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act."
Commission counsel also relied upon the order of the hearing
examiner denying Giant Food's motion to dismiss 83
 in a similar
proceeding:
"There is nothing inconsistent in Congress passing a
general catchall statute, and then because hearings had un-
covered specific practices then in existence and operating,
proceeding to outlaw these per se by specific interdictions
when specific standards were met. Such a statute, of course,
cannot, and does not, cover variations and evasions engen-
dered in future, nor loopholes arising from faulty drafts-
manship or lack of foresight, as witness the adoption of the
Robinson-Patman Amendment. In contrast, the Federal
Trade Commission Act was designedly left flexible, with non-
specific standards, with emphasis on incipiency, potentiality,
and the future, to permit a full examination of all the cir-
cumstances surrounding any commercial practice not yet
having ripened into a Sherman Act violation, nor coming
within the rigid prohibitions of the specific Clayton Act, to
determine whether under all the circumstances such practice
was unfair or reasonable. The Commission was created for
this very purpose of determination."
81 Respondent's Brief before the Hearing Examiner, Oct. 6, 1958, p. 17.
82 Brief of Counsel Supporting Complaint, Opposing Respondent's Appeal, p. 16.
83 Hearing Examiner's Order of February 10, 1956, Docket 6459.
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Commission Counsel also maintained that:
ti
. . . knowing inducement of another to violate the law---
that is, Section 2(d) of the Clayton Act—is patently an
unfair act or practice and an unfair method of competition
in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act."'"
Hearing Examiner John Lewis, in deciding for Commission Coun-
sel, discussed the "broad, general and flexible" standard of Section 5.
He stated:
"Practices of the type which run counter to the policy
of the Clayton Act have been held to constitute unfair
methods of competition under the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act, even though they may not technically fall within
the scope of the former Act. FTC v. Motion Picture Ad-
vertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392, 397; Fashion Origi-
nators Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457; Carter
Carburetor Corp. v. FTC, 112 F.2d 722 (CA 8, 1940).""
Mr. Lewis added:
"It is the opinion of the hearing examiner that one who
knowingly induces another to commit an act which is illegal
under the Clayton Act is himself engaging in an unfair
method of competition, within the meaning of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, unless Congress deliberately in-
tended to exclude such conduct from the category of
illegality. "se
On August 19, 1960, the Commission affirmed the initial deci-
sion," with Commissioner Tait dissenting." In its opinion, written by
Commissioner Secrest, the Commission laid claim to greater power
than it had ever done before. In effect it ruled that it can write anti-
trust laws as it goes along, as long as the abuses attacked "violate
the spirit" of the antitrust laws:
"It is clear from the legislative history of the Federal
Trade Commission Act and the Icing line of court decisions
84 Brief of Counsel Supporting the Complaint Opposing Respondent's Appeal,
p. 18. While the excerpts quoted above are from Respondent's brief before the hearing
examiner, and Commission counsel's brief before the Commission, the excerpts succinctly
state the opposing contentions before both the hearing examiner and Commission, and
for that reason were used.
85 Initial Decision, page 34.
86
 Ibid.
ST 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 11 28980 (1960).
88
 Id. at 37484.
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interpreting Section 5 of the Act that the Commission has the
authority, subject to review by the courts, to determine in
any factual situation before it whether a particular practice
or course of conduct is an unfair method of competition of
an unfair trade practice.""
Commissioner Secrest added:
"We cannot accept respondent's contention that the
Commission's authority in this field is limited under Sec-
tion 5 to established illegal practices previously condemned
by the anti-trust laws. 19°
Federal Trade Commission v. R. F. Kippel & Bro., Inc.,' Fed-
eral Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Co.,". Federal Trade
Commission v. Cement Institute," and Federal Trade Commission v.
Motion Picture Advertising Service, Inc." were cited by the Com-
mission in support of its position. In his dissent, however, Com-
missioner Tait pointed out that none of these cases had gone so far
as the Commission's present position:
"The cases alluded to by my colleagues concerned the well
known 'incipiency doctrine', the soundness of which is un-
questioned; however, this doctrine and the cases cited are
completely irrelevant here, both from a legal and factual
standpoint, since this case—as charged in the complaint
and as tried before the hearing examiner—is not founded
upon any theories of 'incipient' violation of the Sherman
Act or the Clayton Act.
"Nor are the various cases cited any precedent for the
failure to show probable competitive harm. Cases such as
Motion Picture Advertising Service, Inc., Keppel & Bro.,
Inc., Beech-Nut Packing Co., Fashion Guild, and Cement
Institute [citations omitted] all contained findings by the
Commission that the challenged practices had adverse com-
petitive effects. In the Motion Picture Advertising Service
case, for example, it was found that the respondent's exclu-
sive contracts unreasonably restrained competition and
tended to monopoly. The Commission determined in the
respective cases on the basis of injury evidence that the
89 Id. at 37480.
9° Ibid.
91 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
92 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
92 333 LT.S. 683 (1948).
94 344 U.S. 392 (1952).
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practices constituted unfair methods of competition and the
courts agreed, There is no such factual situation here, and
no such findings have been made. Moreover, in these
authorities cited, the courts did not go so far as to hold, as
the majority action herein seems to imply, that the Commis-
sion is empowered to declare as unfair methods of competi-
tion all practices which it may consider to be contrary to 'the
policy of the antitrust laws' or 'which violate the spirit of
the amended [Clayton] Act.' I am concerned by what the
majority does; I am fearful of the implications of what it
says!"e6
The majority accurately pointed out that the Robinson-Patman
Act was aimed more at buyer power than seller power. It added,
correctly I believe, that the Congress did not intentionally exclude the
inducement of a violation of Section 2 (d) from the Robinson-Patman
Act, but probably did so through oversight.
"We think that the most that can be said on this point
from the legislative history and from a reading of the Act
itself is that the practice charged in the complaint is not
specifically prohibited by the Act. Certainly, it cannot be
inferred from this fact that Congress countenanced a prac-
tice which so clearly violates the spirit of the statute.
"In the absence of evidence of Congressional intent
not to render unlawful practices related to those specifically
prohibited by the Robinson-Patman Act, there is no sub-
stance to respondent's argument that the Federal Trade
Commission Act cannot be extended to proscribe discrimi-
natory practices which do not come within the purview of
the Robinson-Patman Act. The rule of statutory construc-
tion is that general and specific statutes should be read to-
gether and harmonized, if possible, and that the specific
statute will prevail over the general only to the extent that
there is conflict between them. There is no dispute as to
whether the specific provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act
are controlling insofar as they specifically prohibit certain
practices. There is nothing in the Act itself, however, which
conflicts with the Commission's broad authority under Sec-
tion 5 to define and proceed against practices which it deems
to be unfair, including those which may come within the
periphery of the later Act, although not within its letter.'
55 Supra note 87, at 37485.
95 Id. at 37482-83.
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In a broad-brush conclusion, the majority held:
"For the foregoing reasons, it is our opinion that it is
the duty of the Commission to 'supplement and bolster' Sec-
tion 2 of the amended Clayton Act by prohibiting under
Section 5 practices which violate the spirit of the amended
Act. Consequently, we believe that if a buyer knowingly
engages in a course of conduct that accomplishes the result
which one of the provisions of the Act is intended to prevent
and which Congress has declared to be injurious to competi-
tion per se, such course of conduct runs counter to the policy
of the Act and, as such, is an unfair trade practice within
the purview of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act."97
To this language Commissioner Tait directed a pointed question:
"In the same vein it is interesting to note that the
failure to include the instant practice under Section 2(f) was
considered as a legislative 'oversight'. Is the majority sug-
gesting that it has the power to correct a Congressional
`oversight' where the 'oversight' concerns a substantive
violation of law? Surely the majority is not advancing the
novel theme that when Congress acts—even as fully as it
has acted here—it had best explain away any inaction or
else this Commission may step in to plug self-asserted gaps
and loop-holes."99
He then summed up what he thought the undesirable effects of the
decision would be:
"If the Commission's authority is so broad that it can
declare unlawful any practice which it believes contrary to
the spirit of the antitrust laws, it is apparent that all of the
provisions of the Robinson-Patman amendment were not
needed. Certainly, Section 2(f) dealing with the knowing
inducement or receipt of price discriminations was unneces-
sary. Any alleged gaps which may appear in the Clayton
Act provisions, under this principle, will not require legis-
lation; the Commission merely has to declare them contrary
to the spirit of the Clayton Act. Furthermore, a businessman
in seeking to comply with the often difficult requirements
of the Robinson-Patman Act, will now have not only the
97 Id. at 37483.
98 Id. at 37485.
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Act to contend with in this antitrust area, but also declara-
tions of per se illegality by the Commission under Section 5.
In other words, in attempting to comply with the law, thou-
sands of businessmen must first determine if the business
practice is legal under the Robinson-Patman Act. Then
they must also determine whether the practice is legal under
a vague standard, herein stated to be 'the spirit of the
amended Act'. I am in vigorous disagreement with an ap-
proach to the law which has too much sail and too little
anchor, or too much supplement and too little bolster."'"
Commissioner Tait pointed out, furthermore, that the majority had
adopted a rule under which the inducement of a disproportionate
promotional allowance was held to be illegal per se. Under the
majority decision, no showing of adverse competitive effect was neces-
sary to the determination of a violation.
The dissent of Commissioner Tait may be grouped by some with
that of Justice Burton in United States v. E. .1. du Pont de Nemours
and Co."' Both appeared to be logical statements of existing law,
but both were bucking a strong tide of judicial antitrust philosophy
which is placing more and more discretionary powers in the hands of
the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.
While there is considerable doubt as to whether the Congress
ever intended the Federal Trade Commission to have the power it
used in Grand Union, probably because Congress did not think of it
when the Robinson-Patman Act was passed, there is no doubt but
that the Commission was curbing buyer power in Grand Union and
that that was the principal purpose of the Act. Of course, the Com-
mission used the much older Federal Trade Commission Act to
bolster the "spirit" of the Robinson-Patman Act. Commissioner Tait
was expressing doubt that the passage of the Robinson-Patman Act,
which omitted, either intentionally or through oversight, to prohibit
the inducing of disproportionate promotional allowances, gave the
Commission power to do the prohibiting under the general terms of
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
To this the majority answered that in passing the Robinson-
Patman Act, Congress had not intentionally excluded conduct of the
sort attacked, and so it was fair game under the broad, flexible powers
of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
If the Commission expertise is to be the determining factor of
99 Id. at 37485-86.
14)° 353 U.S. 586, 608 (1957).
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what constitutes "unfair methods of competition," and the existing
antitrust laws need not be violated, nor need be about to be
violated, for an order of the Commission to be entered, then one can
sympathize with the businessman, or lawyer, trying to understand
what his duties are under Federal antitrust prohibitions. He may
find himself hauled before the Commission "although the practices
may not be specifically prohibited by the language of [the antitrust
laws] or have been previously adjudged to be illegal by the courts.m° 1
To be consistent, of course, Congress should have made the in-
ducing of disproportionate promotional allowances illegal when it
passed the Robinson-Patman Act. If the Courts ultimately reverse
the Grand Union decision, the Commission probably will ask Congress
to amend the law. One gets the impression, however, that Congress is
afraid that if it attempts to make the Robinson-Patman Act a logical,
consistent statute, there will be so much conservative pressure to
weaken it and liberal pressure either to strengthen it or to substitute
for it some different type of government control, that it will remain
untouched for some time to come.
Grand Union's second contention, that Commission Counsel had
not successfully borne the burden of proving that (a) the suppliers
had violated Section 2(d) and (b), that Grand Union knew they had
done so, was likewise unavailing. The Hearing Examiner found that
certain of the suppliers had violated Section 2(d) and that Grand
Union had knowingly induced them to do so.
On appeal to the Commission Grand Union pressed the following
argument:
No promotional allowance, no matter how large, violates
§ 2(d) at the moment it is granted to a customer. It is the
failure of the supplier subsequently to offer proportionally
equal allowances to competitors of that customer which
constitutes the violation. Therefore, it is impossible, per se,
for a customer to induce a violation of § 2(d). No matter
how large an allowance the customer induces, it is lawful
at the time he induces it. The logical conclusion is readily
apparent. Even if, arguendo, § 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act is violated by knowing inducement of a
violation of the Robinson-Patman Act, Grand Union is un-
affected because at the time it induced its suppliers to pay to
go on the sign, the suppliers' payments did not violate the
Robinson-Patman Act. If the suppliers did violate § 2(d)
101 Supra note 87, at 37481.
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of the Robinson-Patman Act, it was their subsequent failure
to offer proportionally equal allowances to competitors of
Grand Union which constituted the violation.
Grand Union added that it had a right to assume that its sup-
pliers would obey the law. Curiously, neither the majority opinion
nor the dissent so much as commented on this argument, although it
took up a good deal of the time on the orgal argument before the
Commission.
The Grand Union proceeding was in the van in this new attack
against buyers, but it was not alone. On March 7, 1960, Hearing
Examiner Loren H. Laughlin filed an initial decision against Giant
Food, Inc.'" Although the wording of the order differed slightly from
that in Grand Union,'" the theories of the cases were the same. It
may be assumed that a standard order will be developed in this type
case as it has, generally, in cases of Robinson-Patman Act violations,
so that in the future, such variation in form will be avoided.
An Initial Decision against The American News Company and
the Union News Company,'" issued on May 26, 1960, determined a
violation of Section 5 and prohibited the inducement of disproportion-
ate promotional allowances, but did not discuss whether Section 5
could be so used. It is interesting to note that the hearing examiner
found specifically that the inducements had an adverse effect upon
competition. The examiner in Giant had made a similar finding. The
Commission's Grand Union decision, issued several months later,
indicated no such finding was necessary.
The decision of the Commission in the American News casem
102 Trade Reg. Rep. (1959-1960 FTC Cas.) II 28624. The complaint in this case
was issued prior to that in Grand Union, but the proceedings were delayed by inter-
locutory matters and the death of Frank Hier, who was the original Hearing Examiner
in the case.
103 The Grand Union order is set forth, pp. 269-70, supra. Giant was ordered to cease
and desist from: "Offering to enter or entering into any contract, agreement, understand-
ing or arrangement or in any other way formulating, creating or adopting any scheme
or method which has for its purpose the inducing of, or actually does induce, any
persons to grant payment of anything of value to or for the benefit of respondent as
compensation or in consideration for any service or facilities furnished by or through
respondent in connection with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of
any products or commodities manufactured, sold, or offered for sale by such persons, un-
less such payment or consideration is available on proportionally equal terms to all other
customers competing with respondent in the distribution of such products or com-
modities."
Giant was charged also with diverting to its own use some money received by it as
promotional allowances, and was ordered to cease and desist from this practice. There
was no similar charge against Grand Union.
104 3 Trade Reg. Rep. II 28811 (1960).
105 3 Trade Reg. Rep. IT 29335 (1961).
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was in accord with its holding in Grand Union. It is interesting to
note, however, that the order of the hearing examiner was modified
by the Commission through the deletion of that part of the order
which prohibited the mere "attempt" to induce discriminatory pay-
ments from suppliers as being violative of Section 5. 1" While recog-
nizing that the request for a promotional allowance does not, of itself,
constitute an inducement to violate Section 2(d), it avoided any
consideration of the "attempt" theory by finding that a lack of suf-
ficient evidence did not warrant consideration of this issue.
It is to be anticipated that a decision will be forthcoming from
the Commission on the "attempt" issue. It will be of interest to see
whether the Commission will expand Section 5 to cover an attempt
to induce promotional allowances when confronted with sufficient
evidence to show, for example, that a buyer has specified that the
requested allowance be granted to him alone.
In a complaint based upon a slightly different theory from that
in Grand Union, the Commission charged R. H. Macy & Co., Inc., 107
with using the force of its purchasing power to induce suppliers to
make contributions to a general sales promotion scheme. As then
Chairman Kintner has noted,'" this complaint would not necessarily
confine the buyer liability to an inducement of the seller to violate
Sections 2(d) or 2(e). The Commission chose not to view the pay-
ments as rebates, thereby constituting a 2(f) violation, but proceeded
under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. This case was
still in the hearing stage as of March 1, 1961.
PROGNOSIS
It remains to be seen how the courts will react to this new use
of Section 5. It could be expected that the Commission would not
decide against the validity of this new weapon in its arsenal, but a
determination by the courts may result in a different conclusion. The
task for the courts will not be an easy one. The meaning and scope
of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act have been a source
of puzzlement since the bill was first argued in Congress.
The Senate Report explained that:
"The Committee gave careful consideration to the ques-
tion as to whether it would attempt to define the many and
variable unfair practices which prevail in commerce and to
1 °8 Id. at 37670.
107 3 Trade Reg. Rep. II 28735 (1960).
108
 Statement at meeting of the Carolinas-Virginia Purchasing Agents Association,
Asheville, North Carolina, June 3, 1960.
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forbid their continuance or whether it would, by a general
declaration, condemning unfair practices, leave it to the
Commission to determine what practices were unfair. It
concluded that the latter course would be the better. . ." 1"
Some members of Congress seemed disturbed by the latitude
and flexibility of the power, and responsibility, about to be delegated
to the new Federal Trade Commission. Senator Sutherland stated
that:
"I do not know whether it is the view of the framers of
this bill that unfair competitors and unfair methods of com-
petition mean the same thing, but I do know that the words
`unfair competition' have a very well settled meaning in the
law and that the words 'unfair methods of competition' do
not. So if we accept that provision as to unfair methods
of competition it seems to me very cearly that we have
authorized the Commission to legislate without laying down
any primary standard."°
A Court of Appeals made its views clear in 1919:
. . . The Commissioners, representing the Government
as parens patriae, are to exercise their common sense, as in-
formed by their knowledge of the general idea of unfair trade
at common law, and stop all those trade practices that have a
capacity or tendency to injure competitors directly or through
deception of purchasers, quite irrespective of whether the
specific practices in question have yet been denounced in
common-Iaw cases.”"i
Six years later, in FTC v. Gratz, the Supreme Court spoke:
"The words 'unfair methods of competition' are not de-
fined by the statute and their exact meaning is in dispute.
It is for the courts, not the Commission, ultimately to deter-
mine as matter of law, what they include. They are clearly
inapplicable to practices never heretofore regarded as op-
posed to good morals because characterized by deception,
bad faith, fraud or oppression, or as against public policy
because of their dangerous tendency unduly to hinder com-
petition or create monopoly. The act was certainly not in-
109 Committee on Interstate Commerce, S. Rep. No. 59, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13
(June 13, 1914).
110 51 Cong. Rec. 12814 (1914).
ill Sears Roebuck & Company v. FTC, 258 Fed. 307, 311 (7th Cir. 1919).
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tended to fetter free and fair competition as commonly un-
derstood and practiced by honorable opponents in trade."'
This language apparently rules out the use of Section 5 in situa-
tions such as Grand Union and Giant, and the Gratz case has never
been expressly repudiated.
However, the Supreme Court commented again two years after
Gratz:
"What shall constitute unfair methods of competition
denounced by the act, is left without specific definition.
Congress deemed it better to leave the subject without pre-
cise definition, and to have each case determined upon its
own facts, owing to the multifarious means by which it is
sought to effectuate such scheme. The Commission, in the
first instance, subject to the judicial review provided, has the
determination of practices which come within the scope of
the act. (See Report No. 597, Senate Committee on Inter-
state Commerce, June 13, 1914, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess.)." 113
Apparently the Gratz concept of Section 5 had been broadened.
However, FTC v. Raladam affirmed that:
"The question [of the meaning to be given the words
`unfair methods of competition'] is one for the final determi-
nation of the courts and not of the Commission. 7" 14
In FTC v. Keppel & Bros.,'" relied upon heavily by the ma-
jority in Grand Union, the Supreme Court again tried to help:
"The Act undoubtedly was aimed at all the familiar
methods of law violations which prosecution under the Sher-
man Act had disclosed. See Federal Trade Commission v.
Raladam Co., supra, 649, 650. But as this court has pointed
out it also had a broader purpose, Federal Trade Commis-
sion v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483, 493; Federal
Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., supra, 648. As proposed
by the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce and as in-
troduced in the Senate, the bill which ultimately became the
Federal Trade Commission Act declared 'unfair competition'
to be unlawful. But it was because the meaning which the
common law has given to those words was deemed too nar-
112 FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 427 (1920).
113 FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Company, 257 U.S. 441, 453 (1922).
114 283 U.S. 421, 427 (1931).
115 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
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row that the broader and more flexible phrase 'unfair meth-
ods of competition' was substituted. Congress in defining
the powers of the Commission, thus advisedly adopted a
phrase which, as this court has said, does not 'admit of
precise definition but the meaning and application of which
must be arrived at by what this court elsewhere has called
"the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion'."
Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., supra, 648.
Compare Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104.' 16
Dicta in the famous Schechter Poultry casel" was in broader
language, and certainly went further than Gratz, but still was not
too helpful:
" . . . What are 'unfair methods of competition' are thus
to be determined in particular instances, upon evidence, in
the light of particular competitive conditions and of what is
found to be a specific and substantial public interest." 8
In FTC v. Bunte Bros., 1 '9 the Supreme Court described Section 5
as "a flexible concept with evolving content."
Also, in 1941, the Supreme Court used language expressly relied
upon by Commission Counsel in Grand Union:
"If the purpose and practice of the combination of gar-
ment manufacturers and their affiliates runs counter to the
public policy declared in the Sherman and Clayton Acts, the
Federal Trade Commission has the power to suppress it as
an unfair method of competition." 12° (Emphasis supplied.)
Certainly, the argument went, it is against the policy of the Clay-
ton Act, if not against its provisions, to induce someone to violate
Section 2(d) of the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman
Act.
In 1946, one Circuit Court concluded the narrow limitation of
Section 5 as set forth in Gratz was no longer law. It stated:
"Conscious as we are of the danger in lifting specific
observations from their content, we are nevertheless im-
pressed by the fact that acts not in themselves illegal or
criminal, or even immoral, may, when repeated and con-
tinued and their impact upon commerce is fully revealed,
116 Id. at 311-12.
117 A.LA. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1934).
118 Id. at 532.
119 312 U.S. 349, 353 (1941).
120 Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC, 132 U.S. 457, 463 (1941).
283
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
constitute an unfair method of competition within the scope
of the Commission's authority to regulate and forbid. So
with respondent's practices, it may not be illegal for a manu-
facturer to buy up the obsolescent or unsalable stock of his
competitors so long as he does not throw it upon the market
at cut-rate prices to destroy his competitor's business or the
goodwill attaching to his product. It is not illegal for a
manufacturer to finance his retail outlets or to guarantee
the products, but undoubtedly the utilization of these ex-
pedients, singularly or in combination, as an inducement to
jobbers to throw out competing lines and to handle, exclu-
sively or preferentially, the products of a manufacturer
`from whom such blessings flow,' may well be within the
statutory concept of unfair methods of competition."'"
In 1953 the Supreme Court commented on the present state of
Section 5:
"The 'unfair methods of competition', which are con-
demned by § 5(a) of the Act, are not confined to those that
were illegal at common law or that were condemned by the
Sherman Act. Federal Trade Commission v. Keppel Bro.,
291 U.S. 304. Congress advisedly left the concept flexible
to be defined with particularity by the myriad of cases from
the field of business, Id., pp. 310-312. It is also clear that
the Federal Trade Commission was designed to supplement
and bolster the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act (see Fed-
eral Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Co., 257 U.S. 441,
453)—to stop in their incipiency acts and practices which,
when full blown would violate those Acts (see Fashion
Guild v. Federal Trade Commission, 312 U.S. 457, 463,
466), as well as to condemn as 'unfair methods of competi-
tion' existing violations of them. See Federal Trade Com-
mission v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 691.'""
and:
"The point where a method of competition. becomes 'un-
fair' within the meaning of the act will often turn on the
exigencies of a particular situation, trade practices, or the
practical requirements of the business in question.'"
121 Hastings Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 153 F.2d 253, 257 (6th Cir. 1946), cert, denied, 328
U.S. 853 (1946).
122 FTC v. Motion Picture Adv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1952).
in Id. at 396.
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Justice Frankfurter in dissenting stated:
"The curb on the Commission's power, as expressed
by the series of cases beginning with the Gratz case, supra,
so as to leave to the Courts rather than the Commission the
final authority in determining what is an unfair method of
competition, would be relaxed, and unbridled intervention
into business practices encouraged."'
CONCLUSION
By what standards can the courts judge the Federal Trade Com-
mission in its use of Section 5 when the Commission uses that statute
in a new way, proscribing a practice not defined as unlawful at
common law or in another statute? Are the courts to judge the reason-
ableness of new proscriptions based upon Section 5? Does the in-
terpretation by the Commission of Section 5 necessarily mean that it
can create new antitrust laws as it may see fit, using as justification
therefor the "expertise" ascribed to it? Is the Commission limited by
acts contravening the "policy" of the antitrust laws? Is such a real
limitation? These are substantial questions which should prove of
some concern to the courts and will almost certainly have to be re-
solved as Grand Union, American News and, presumably, Giant, as
well as others, are appealed from the final decisions of the Com-
mission.
We have traced the development of antitrust enforcement and
application over the years in a relatively small area, yet the conclu-
sion seems warranted that expansion in the interpretation of the
scope of antitrust coverage in this area has been significant. It would
appear, from this, that the courts may well conclude that the exten-
sion of Section 5 to encompass activities which the Commission may,
from time to time, determine to be violative of the "spirit" of the
Robinson-Patman Act will be found compatible with the purpose of
Section 5 and the antitrust laws to which it may be related. If this
quite real possibility matures into reality, then Caveat Emptor will
be indeed a reality also. In an area of the law which supports its
share of confusion in interpretation, with correspondingly difficult
problems in compliance, these problems will be compounded by the
extension of the rather uncertain test of "unfair methods of com-
petition."
It is perhaps ironic that the liability of the seller is now corn-
124 Id. at 405.
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paratively clear, while that of the buyer, the original target of the
Robinson-Patman Act, remains far from settled almost twenty-five
years after the passage of the Act. Perhaps this extension of Section 5
by the Federal Trade Commission will serve to narrow, if not entirely
remove, the disparity in liability which has existed between the buyer
and seller in the past. it remains to be seen.
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